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I. Introduction1 
 
The foremost proponent of the 'consent solution' to the justification of 
punishment was the legal scholar Carlos Santiago Nino (1943-1993), and I 
will take Nino's account to be paradigmatic for consensual theories of 
punishment.2 The attraction of Carlos S. Nino's consensual theory of 
punishment is that it attempts to obviate the need to establish that the 
wrong-doer has political obligations and, most importantly, the obligation 
to obey the law. Establishing that a citizen has such obligations has proven 
to be difficult and controversial (starting from Socrates' acceptance of the 
death penalty to more recent justifications). The important feature of 
Nino's theory of punishment is that the wrong-doer, by committing an 
illegal act, consents to assume a liability to punishment. If caught and 
convicted, this 'assumption of liability' would be decisive for punishing an 
offender – without having to establish that citizens, including the offender, 
have an obligation to obey the law. According to Nino individuals have 
moral obligations, whether they consent to them or not. And the criminal 
law, on the whole, tends to track these moral obligations. 
Nino's theory has, regrettably, not been widely discussed – notable 
exceptions are Ted Honderich3, Thomas Scanlon and, most recently, 
David Boonin4. I will concentrate on one objection's to Nino's theory: 
ignorance of the law precludes consent (to assume liability to punishment) 
and would thus be an excuse.  
In this paper I will discuss two aspects of ignorance of the law: 
ignorance of illegality (including mistaking the law) and ignorance of the 
penalty; and I will look at the implications for natives, for tourists and for 
immigrants. I will argue that consensual theories of punishment need to 
rely on two premises in order to justify that (claiming) ignorance of the 
law is no excuse. The first premise explains why individuals are presumed 
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to 'know' current laws. The second premise explains why individuals are 
presumed to 'know' new legislation. 
This means that the principle 'Ignorantia juris non excusat' does not 
derive its force from utilitarian justifications (e.g. 'the law must be upheld 
at all cost') or from the assumption that individuals have so-called 'duties 
of citizenship', but rather from the insight that individuals are, normally, 
sufficiently equipped to work out, what the (criminal) law requires and do 
indeed work it out. In the last part of the paper I ask: When ought a liberal 
state accept ignorance of the law as an excuse? And I propose an answer. 
II. Ignorantia juris non excusat 
In Nino's consensual theory of punishment a penalty can only be 
imposed if certain requirements are met: 1. 'the person punished must have 
been able to prevent the act to which a liability to suffer punishment is 
attached' and 2. 'he must have consented to perform the act which involves 
a liability to suffer punishment' and 3. 'he must have known that the 
undertaking of the liability was a necessary consequence of the act he 
consented to perform. This obviously implies the requirement of 
knowledge of the law and the proscription of retroactive criminal 
provisions.'5 A problem arises here: it seems that ignorance of the law 
would have to count as an excuse for a consensual theory of punishment. 
When we talk about ignorance of the law there are two possibilities 
which we need to consider.6 First, the offender might not have known that 
the act in question was against the law. Second, she might have been 
mistaken about the law in two distinct ways. The offender might have 
been mistaken in applying the law (e.g. how much force can one use in 
self-defence) – this would be equivalent to ignorance of illegality and thus 
might excuse her. There is, of course, a conceptual difference between not 
knowing the law and mistaking it, but in practice this distinction is usually 
disregarded.7 Alternatively, the offender might have been mistaken about 
the penalty for breaking the law; she might have envisaged a lesser 
punishment. It seems that she would then only be liable to the lesser 
punishment. 
Let us consider in how far Nino's theory can deal with these 
possibilities. In modern democracies, or in liberal societies, if a new law is 
introduced, there might be a consultation period, discussion in the media 
and, most importantly, before the law comes into force, the public is 
informed about it (i.e. promulgation). New laws are normally well 
publicised, particularly if they carry severe penalties or if they affect many 
people (e.g. the prohibition against using one's mobile phone while 
Miroslav Imbrisevic 
 
59 
driving). Thus one unstated premise for Nino's theory must be the 
following:  
 
P1: For an individual who wants to live within society, it is a requirement 
of prudence to keep reasonably well informed about changes in the law. 
 
If the individual does not do so, she runs the risk (i.e. consents to the 
risk) of suffering harm through punishment without knowing when and 
where she will incur this liability. This requirement of prudence – needs to 
be sharply distinguished from any alleged duties of citizenship8, duties to 
others or to the state. The prudential requirement, of keeping reasonably 
well informed about changes in the law, can be achieved, without great 
cost to the individual, by reading a newspaper, watching the news or just 
by interacting with friends, family or work colleagues. It is not something 
that the individual need actively pursue. One could stay abreast of new 
legislation (which is immediately relevant to individuals) through the 
everyday interactions one has in society. What is actively required for 
living within society is not to shut oneself off from society; one should not 
act like a 'hermit' if one wants to live in society.9 If you consciously decide 
not to keep informed, if you shut yourself off from society, then you 
consent to run the risk of harm through punishment, but without knowing 
when and where you will incur the liability to punishment.10 
So, for new laws, ignorance is no excuse, because they have been 
properly publicised. And if the individual wants to take part in societal life 
and wants to avoid suffering harm through punishment, it is a requirement 
of prudence to keep reasonably well informed about changes in the law 
(i.e. not to live like a 'hermit' within society). But what about 'old' laws. 
Most of them were publicised before the individual was born. Could this 
be an excuse?  
Judges and courts, normally, do not accept ignorance of 'old' laws as an 
excuse. Why? Because everybody is presumed to know the law of the 
land. This presumption relates primarily to mala in se – which always 
carry the severest punishments. Mala in se are considered to be the most 
reprehensible crimes in society (e.g. murder, torture and rape). Individuals 
are inculcated from an early age with moral knowledge. Part of this moral 
knowledge is learning about mala in se, which is a relatively small corpus 
of knowledge. Whereas learning about (the multitude) of mala prohibita 
might not be part of this moral education – the individual usually learns 
about them at a later age. 
It is actually impossible, even for legal scholars, to 'know' all mala 
prohibita. But this is not as troubling as it seems at first glance. Citizens, 
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usually, do not live in fear of breaking the law by accident, and large 
numbers of them are not routinely punished for unwittingly committing 
illegal acts. Why is this? Because individuals acquire the ability to work 
out what might be a malum prohibitum. Furthermore, only a fraction of all 
possible mala prohibita would ever be relevant to an individual. It might, 
therefore be prudent to acquaint oneself with such mala prohibita. For 
example, an individual who sets up business as a (private) day trader, 
ought to find out about the relevant legislation, particularly the legislation 
against insider trading (– this is, again, a requirement of prudence). And 
lastly, ignorance of the law is more likely to be accepted as an excuse for 
mala prohibita, particularly if it is clear that there was no mens rea.11 
Ignorance of current laws would not count as an excuse because an 
individual is normally socialised by their parents, through attending school 
and through interacting with other people. Thus, by the age of 
culpability12, an individual is normally aware of which acts are morally 
most reprehensible in society (and there is a large overlap between 
committing such acts and between 'illegal acts' which carry the most 
severe penalties in law).13 And, secondly, she would have acquired a 
(basic) grasp of what the law prohibits (or what types of actions the law 
might prohibit14). So, a further unstated premise for Nino's theory must be: 
 
P2: Growing up in society, normally, provides the individual with 
knowledge of what is morally wrong and what is/might be legally wrong. 
 
At the age of culpability the moral knowledge would (ideally) be 
comprehensive, whereas the legal knowledge can only be expected to be 
basic – but it will expand in time.  
It is presumed that the combination of these two elements (i.e. moral 
and legal knowledge) sufficiently equips a person to work out which 
actions might be against the law, so that they will not accidentally suffer 
harm through punishment. J.R. Lucas writes: 'Law is not simply something 
the sovereign tells his subjects to do, but is rather something that the 
subjects themselves work out in their daily lives. It is a social phenomenon, 
part of their way of life.'15  
The individual also knows that any act, which is (either morally and/or 
legally) wrong, might carry a penalty. When in doubt, it would be a 
requirement of prudence to find out, whether something is illegal (e.g. 
what is a tax loophole, what is tax avoidance and what counts as tax 
evasion). 
However, there could be acts, prohibited by law, which are not well 
known to the public. But since these acts are either obscure and/or clearly 
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wrong, they would not pose a serious threat to Nino's consensual theory of 
punishment. With regard to the former, such acts have presumably become 
obscure because violations are either not being prosecuted any more (e.g. 
blasphemy in English or Scottish law) or they would only affect very few 
people (at present the British monarch cannot marry a Catholic).16  
With regard to acts which are clearly wrong, David Boonin17 gives an 
example from the Martha-Stewart-Trial in the US, in which it became 
apparent that most Americans did not know that there was a law against 
lying to a federal agent, even if not under oath. Boonin believes that this 
example of ignorance of the law shows a weakness of Nino's consensual 
theory of punishment.  
However, we need to distinguish two different contexts here. It may 
well be that many Americans did not know this. All that this illustrates is 
that most people only have a incomplete grasp of the law. But had they 
been in Martha Stewart's shoes they ought – and would – have worked out 
that they were about to do something which was seriously wrong. 
Martha Stewart was convicted of insider trading, and when she had 
lied to a federal officer, she presumably knew that lying is normally 
wrong. But, more importantly, she could have worked out – and probably 
did – that lying to an officer of the state, who is investigating a possible 
crime, is more serious than lying in the private sphere. In the former 
context lying constitutes an obstruction of justice. She could have worked 
out that her lying might have legal-normative consequences. And, if – 
genuinely – in doubt, she should have sought legal advice.  
There may, occasionally, be cases where the defendant appears to have 
sufficient moral and legal knowledge to work out the legality/illegality of 
an act, but, nevertheless, the defendant claims ignorance of the law.18 Here 
the defendant appears to stop short of the last step in our everyday 
intuitions about morality and the law: she claims not to have worked out 
that her actions were or might be illegal. In such unusual circumstances 
the medical profession/psychologists will surely be able to ascertain and 
explain that the defendant's claim is genuine. In such rare cases ignorance 
would count as an excuse. But in all other cases, where such claims are 
made (Martha Stewart might have fit this description), courts would 
presumably class them as instances of 'wilful blindness'. Here 'a defendant 
claims a lack of knowledge' and 'the facts suggest a conscious course of 
deliberate ignorance'.19 
 Lastly, let us consider tourists visiting other countries. Any reasonably 
well informed (or properly socialised) person would know that the legal 
systems in other countries might differ from one's own legal system. 
Therefore, in analogy to 'Premise 1' (keeping reasonably well informed 
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about changes in the law of one's own country), it would be a requirement 
of prudence for the tourist to find out about any important differences in 
the law of the country he is about to visit. It seems reasonable, before 
going on a driving holiday to the US, to find out how the rules of the road 
differ (e.g. the prohibition to overtake school buses while they are 
stopping). 
Furthermore, friends, family, work colleagues and/or the travel agent 
would presumably also warn the person that, for example, in Arab 
countries a different code of conduct is required. Often the differences are 
well publicised. For example, before Singapore imposed the ban on 
importing chewing gum (even for personal use), this was widely reported; 
and there was a transition period, before the ban was enforced.  
If a tourist is visiting a country which is known for a strict code of 
conduct (say, Iran), this requirement of prudence takes on more urgency. 
When visiting a country with a similar legal system, it might not seem 
necessary to find out more about their legal system, and most people do 
not do so. If there is an infraction, ignorance of the law might lead to 
punishment, but this is unlikely to be severe, because the infraction would 
not be something which is morally reprehensible (e.g. jaywalking in the 
US). Therefore, there is also the likelihood that the other legal system 
might treat the tourist with some leniency (for jaywalking).20  
In such cases the imposition of a minor punishment/fine would be just, 
because the tourist did not bother to become acquainted with the other 
legal system. The tourist consented to run the risk of being liable to 
punishment, because she calculated that, the legal systems being similar, 
she might not commit any offences unwittingly, or, if she did, the 
punishment would not be severe.  
What if the tourist unwittingly committed an offence for which the 
punishment were severe, even in a country with a similar cultural/legal 
background (say, the US)? The first person to do so would suffer indeed, 
and one could see an element of injustice in this. But such a case would 
presumably be well publicised, and subsequent tourists would know and/or 
be warned about the severe penalty for this particular act.21  
The prudential requirement for tourists to become informed about any 
differences in law holds a fortiori for immigrants to another country. 
Martin P. Golding states: 'Especially immigrants, who are aware of the 
many discrepancies between their original culture and their new home, 
should make the effort to find out the legalities and illegalities of what 
they propose to do.'22 If they don't become informed, they run the risk of 
being liable to punishment, but without knowing when and how they will 
incur this liability. 
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However, if the immigrants come from a society, with a fundamentally 
different conception of 'the law' (say, a tribal society), then the state has a 
'duty of care' to the immigrants – and to its own citizens. In such 
exceptional circumstances the state ought to educate the immigrants with 
regard to the law/the legal system beforehand. 
Let us consider differences in penalties between countries. If the act in 
question is clearly wrong, even in the home country of the tourist (or 
immigrant), but carries a harsher penalty in the other country, ignorance of 
the law would not be an excuse. For example, if the penalty for drink 
driving is harsher in the country the tourist is visiting, she cannot argue 
that the lesser penalty of his home country should apply to her because she 
was ignorant of the difference in penalties. Performing an illegal (or 
immoral) act in another country, is assuming (i.e. consenting to) a liability 
to risk (and here, without knowledge of the possible scope of penalties). 
Thus, the tourist is acting imprudently in going through with the illegal 
act.  
Boonin mentions another, general, problem for the consent solution: 
many natives 'do not know the penalties for the illegal acts they knowingly 
perform.'23 They are not just mistaken about the tariff attached to an illegal 
act, they do not know what the tariff might be in the first place. But, as I 
have argued in the previous paragraph, knowingly performing an illegal 
act (and thus assuming liability to punishment) without knowledge of the 
scope of penalties, is an act of imprudence – or folly. 
Boonin24 is right that in such cases one could not say that the offender 
consented to the punishment, because he did not know what the 
punishment would be. But this does not correctly reflect Nino's position. 
The offender does not consent to a specific punishment, she consents to 
the loss of immunity from punishment. Thus, being certain about which 
tariff is attached to an illegal act, is not a necessary condition for the 
imposition of punishment in Nino's theory. The voluntary assumption of 
risk of an offender who is not certain about the attached penalty, Nino 
could argue, is analogous to the voluntary assumption of risk in the law of 
torts. When accepting a lift from a drunk driver, to use one of Nino's 
examples,25 the injured party, did assume liability for any injury (or 
worse), but without knowing whether they would in fact be injured and, if 
so, without knowing the extent of the injury. 
Furthermore, for many illegal acts the law allows for flexibility in the 
imposition of punishments (e.g. a fine between £1 000 and £10 000; or 
imprisonment between 5 to 10 years). Thus, very often, the offender 
cannot know what the exact punishment for her will be. It is the voluntary 
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assumption of the legal-normative consequences which the offender 
consents to, rather than a particular punishment.26  
The adjudication in criminal law suggests that, generally, knowledge of 
the law (primarily relating to mala in se) is presupposed by the judges. But 
'knowledge of the law' does not mean to know all of the law or to have the 
near perfect grasp of a legal scholar. It means, having comprehensive/ 
expert moral knowledge combined with a (basic) grasp of the law (or of 
'right and wrong'). To 'know the law' does not mean the ability to recall 
facts about the law. If that were so, we would have children learn the law 
by rote, just like the times tables. Rather, 'to know the law' means the 
ability to work out if an act might have legal normative consequences. 
This view seems to be an accepted practice in liberal societies. For this 
reason children, the mentally handicapped and the insane are not seen as 
culpable.27  
A complete grasp or knowledge of the law is only a theoretical 
possibility. 'There is no presumption in this country that every person 
knows the law: it would be contrary to common sense and reason if it were 
so … If there were not [such a thing as a doubtful point of law], there 
would be no need of courts of appeal, the existence of which shews that 
judges may be ignorant of law.'28  
Even though nobody can be said to 'know' all of the law, ignorance of 
the law is normally not an excuse, because citizens are presumed to have 
sufficient moral knowledge and/or sufficient legal knowledge to be able to 
work out for themselves which actions might be in agreement or contrary 
to the law.29  
Robert Goodin writes that 'by and large we simply surmise what is a 
crime, at law, from what we know about what is wrong, morally.'30 If the 
(criminal) law did not track morality, then one could be prosecuted for 
actions, which one did not know to be 'wrong'. Then, one would have to 
strive to know all the law, because morality would not function as a guide 
to required standards in society, nor to the particular requirements of the 
law.31 In such a situation, ignorance of the law would presumably be a 
much more frequent occurrence and would indeed be costly. 
Goodin writes:  
 
'For people to have good epistemic access to the content of the law, what is 
needed is: 
1) A way for people to intuit, without detailed investigation, what the law 
is for most common and most important cases of their conduct; 
2) A way for people to intuit when their intuitions are likely to be 
unreliable, and hence that they need to investigate further what the law 
actually is.'32 
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Society normally does equip the individual with the tools to have good 
epistemic access to the content of the law: comprehensive moral 
knowledge combined with (basic) legal knowledge. Thus, the unstated 
premises (P1 and P2) in Nino's theory justify that the default position of 
courts is: Ignorantia juris non excusat. However, it would be better and 
clearer to say: Claiming ignorance of the law will, normally, not count as 
an excuse. 
III. When Would a Liberal State Accept Ignorance  
of the Law as an Excuse? 
When it is impossible to know the law: for example, if there is a 
change of the law in England while a ship is at high seas in the 18th 
century – the ship's crew will find out about the law change two months 
later, when they return to port.33 Secondly, when the defendant 'relies on a 
judicial opinion, administrative judgement, or other official interpretations 
of the law that subsequently proves to be erroneous.'34 Another example 
would be retroactive legislation. According to Nino, knowledge of the law 
entails that there must not be any 'retroactive criminal provisions.'35 Why? 
Because it would be impossible to have knowledge of the law, if certain 
acts were to be criminalised retroactively.36 In such an instance ignorance 
of the law would be an excuse (– from the perspective of a just legal 
system). I would suggest that we can derive a general principle from all of 
this: 
 
Ignorance of the law is to count as an excuse only if it is impossible to 
know the law or if the individual does not have the capacity to work out 
what the law might require. The maxim (ignorance of the law is no excuse) 
might also be applicable for mala prohibita if done unwittingly 
(particularly for the ever expanding regulatory legislation). 
 
I would submit that the maxim 'ignorance of the law is no excuse' does 
not derive its force from considerations like 'the law must be upheld at all 
cost'37, or, 'if we did not assume the maxim, criminals would go free' (we 
presume that most people professing ignorance are lying, and we accept 
that occasionally genuinely ignorant people are punished38), or, 'it would 
be difficult and costly' to ascertain what people knew about the law, or, 'it 
would encourage ignorance of the law', or, 'it would establish idiosyncratic 
interpretations as law'. All such justifications suffer from a weakness – 
their justification is utilitarian. They shut off the plausible intuition that 
sometimes ignorance of the law ought to count as an excuse, because only 
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the blameworthy (i.e. those who consented to assume liability to 
punishment) should be subject to punishment of the criminal law. Such 
justifications disregard what the individual deserves. They do not address 
the individual and her ends – and this is what a consensual theory of 
punishment aims to do – and what a liberal society ought to do. The 
maxim, ignorance of the law is no excuse, derives its force from the 
premises P1 and P2, rather than from any utilitarian considerations. 
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